

Message Text

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EXDIS

E.O. 11652: GDS

TAGS: PFOR, PINS, GR, TU, CY

SUBJECT: CYPRUS; PRELIMINARY REFLECTIONS FROM ATHENS

1. ON THE ASSUMPTION THAT PRESIDENT MAKARIOS HAS BEEN ASSASSINATED AND THEREFORE DISAPPEARS FROM THE SCENE, THE MOST IMPORTANT US OBJECTIVE NOW MUST BE TO PRESERVE OUR NATIONAL INTERESTS AS THEY MAY BE AFFECTED BY DEVELOPMENTS IN CYPRUS. AS I SEE IT, THERE ARE THREE MAJOR ELEMENTS INVOLVED.

A. ABOVE ALL, WE MUST PREVENT THE SITUATION FROM DETERIORATING INTO ARMED CONFLICT BETWEEN GREECE AND TURKEY. WHATEVER ACTION WE TAKE OUGHT TO BE ORIENTED TO PRESERVING TO MAXIMUM EXTENT POSSIBLE THE INTEGRITY OF THE SOUTHERN FLANK OF NATO.

B. WE CONTINUE TO FAVOR AN INDEPENDENT, PRO-WESTERN CYPRUS.

C. WE SHOULD SUPPORT IN APPROPRIATE WAYS ANY MEASURES THAT CAN BE TAKEN TO AVERT CIVIL WAR WHETHER CREATED BY REACTION OF THE POWERFUL AKEL MACHINERY, BY LYSSARIDES AND HIS PARAMILITARY FORCES, BY WHATEVER SUPPORTERS THERE MAY BE REMAINING OF MAKARIOS, OR BY OTHER FORCES. CIVIL WAR WOULD VERY LIKELY BRING

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TURKISH ARMED FORCES TO THE ISLAND INCREASING THE

LIKELIHOOD OF ARMED CONFRONTATION BETWEEN THE GREEK AND TURKISH CYPRIOTS.

2. IT SEEMS LIKELY THAT SELF-INTEREST WILL PROPEL A VARIETY OF NATIONS TO TAKE MORE THAN CASUAL INTEREST IN DEVELOPMENTS IN CYPRUS. THE OBVIOUS ASSOCIATION OF THE IOANNIDES REGIME WITH DEVELOPMENTS IN CYPRUS AND CLEAR INDICATIONS OF CAREFUL ADVANCE PLANNING REVEAL THAT THE REGIME HERE HAS DECIDED TO BRING ABOUT WHAT THEY REGARD AS A DEFINITIVE SETTLEMENT OF THE CYPRUS PROBLEM. THEIR INEXPERIENCE AND THEIR WILLINGNESS TO PURSUE A POLICY OF DANGEROUS BRINKMANSHIP WILL MAKE VITAL EXPRESSIONS OF CONCERN AND APPROPRIATE ACTION BY ALL WHO SHARE AN INTEREST IN A PEACEFUL SOLUTION IN CYPRUS.

3. THE BRITISH AS SIGNATORY OF LONDON-ZURICH AGREEMENTS WILL OF COURSE TAKE PRIMARY INTEREST IN PRESERVING THEIR SBA'S AND RE-CREATING STABILITY ON THE ISLAND. THE TURKS WILL BE DEEPLY CONCERNED LEST THE GREEK MOVE IN FACT CREATES DE FACTO ENOSIS. DESPITE ASSURANCES BY THE "GOVERNMENT OF NATIONAL SALVATION" TO THE CONTRARY, THEY MAY DECIDE TO RE-ENFORCE TURKISH MILITARY PRESENCE ON THE ISLAND. (THIS ASSUMES OF COURSE THERE HAS BEEN NO PRIOR AGREEMENT BETWEEN TURKISH AND GREEK MILITARY WHICH IN VIEW OF EXACERBATION OF RELATIONS ON AEGEAN CONTROVERSY SEEMS UNLIKELY.)

4. THE SOVIETS WILL BE INTERESTED, UNLESS THEY CONSIDER INTERVENTION MIGHT ENDANGER THEIR POLICY OF "DETENTE", IN STIMULATING VIOLENT REACTION BY AKEL AND THE LYSSARIDES PARAMILITARY APPARATUS, HOPING IN THIS WAY TO BRING IN THE UN SO AS TO PRESERVE THE NEUTRALITY AND THIRD WORLD ROLE OF CYPRUS. ANY MOVE TOWARD DOUBLE ENOSIS AGREED BETWEEN GREECE AND TURKEY WOULD IN SOVIET EYES BRING CYPRUS INTO NATO AND THUS REPRESENT A STRATEGIC WORSENING OF SITUATION IN THE EASTERN MEDITERRANEAN FROM THEIR STANDPOINT. ON OTHER HAND, IT SHOULD BE REMEMBERED THAT SOVIETS HAVE ALWAYS CONSIDERED THE PRESENCE OF SBA'S THERE AS EFFECTIVELY MAKING CYPRUS AVAILABLE

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FOR NATO PURPOSES. SMALLER THIRD WORLD COUNTRIES ARE LIKELY TO BE UPSET AT THIS ACT OF VIOLENCE WHICH APPEARS TO HAVE BEEN INITIATED BY MEMBER OF NATO ALLIANCE.

5. THERE IS LIKELY TO BE BROAD POLITICAL REACTION IN WESTERN EUROPE AND THE UNITED STATES BECAUSE OF APPARENT BRUTAL EXTENSION OF MILITARY DICTATORSHIP FROM ATHENS TO CYPRUS. FEW WILL BELIEVE THE PROMISE OF

"GOVERNMENT OF NATIONAL SALVATION" FOR ELECTIONS WITHIN ONE YEAR AFTER THE MISERABLE PERFORMANCE OF THE REGIME HERE ON POLITICAL NORMALIZATION.

6. IT WOULD THEREFORE SEEM TO BE IN OUR INTEREST TO DO EVERYTHING POSSIBLE AND APPROPRIATE TO PROMOTE RETURN TO A DEMOCRATIC POLITICAL STRUCTURE OF THE KIND

WHICH HAS JUST BEEN OVERTHROWN IN CYPRUS. THIS WOULD REQUIRE PROCEEDING RAPIDLY TOWARD SUCCESSFUL CONCLUSION OF THE INTERCOMMUNAL TALKS AND ARRANGING EARLY ELECTIONS WITHIN PRESENT CONSTITUTIONAL SYSTEM. CLERIDES HAS ALWAYS SEEMED TO US HERE LIKELY TO BE MORE REASONABLE AND LESS DOGMATIC IN ARGUMENTS BETWEEN TURKISH CYPRIOTS AND GREEKS ON SOME CONSTITUTIONAL ADJUSTMENTS TO ENABLE TWO COMMUNITIES TO LIVE IN PEACE AND DECONFRONTATION. (WE FIND RADIO REPORT THAT NICOS SAMPSON HAS JUST BEEN NAMED PRESIDENT DISCOURAGING DEVELOPMENT IN THIS RESPECT.)

7. AS TO FUTURE ACTION, WE ASSUME THAT UN WILL BE DEEPLY INVOLVED BECAUSE OF ITS INDEPENDENT PEACEKEEPING ROLE AND BECAUSE OF ACT OF VIOLENCE AGAINST CHIEF OF A GOVERNMENT WHOSE COUNTRY WAS UN MEMBER, DESPITE WHATEVER LIMITATIONS WERE IMPOSED ON ITS SOVEREIGNTY BY LONDON-ZURICH AGREEMENTS.

8. WE SHOULD ANTICIPATE CHARGES OF U.S. HAVING ENCOURAGED MOVE AGAINST MAKARIOS THROUGH OUR ALLEGED INFLUENCE ON GREEK MILITARY OR IN ORDER TO DISPOSE OF LEFTIST AND COMMUNIST STRENGTH ON ISLAND. WE SHALL HAVE TO STAND ON OUR POLICY, AS STRESSED REPEATEDLY BY SECRETARY KISSINGER, OF NON-INTERVENTION IN GREECE AS WELL AS OTHER COUNTRIES OF THE WORLD. THIS REMAINS
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STANDING US POLICY, AND WE CANNOT BE RESPONSIBLE FOR WHAT OTHER COUNTRIES MAY DO IN THIS RESPECT EXCEPT AS IT MAY AFFECT OUR VITAL INTERESTS.

9. IT REMAINS FOR USG TO DETERMINE WHAT ACTION IT CAN AND SHOULD TAKE TO PRESERVE OUR INTERESTS AT THIS POINT. IN MY VIEW, I CONSIDER IT IMPORTANT THAT (A) U.S. REITERATE ITS OPPOSITION TO RESORT TO VIOLENCE AS A SOLUTION TO NATIONAL AND INTERNATIONAL PROBLEMS AND OUR SUPPORT FOR AN INDEPENDENT CYPRUS; (B) US SHOULD ENLIST OUR NATO ALLIES, AS WELL AS NATO SYG LUNS TO INFORM THE GREEK REGIME REGARDING CONCERN OF ALLIANCE ABOUT THE COURSE OF DEVELOPMENTS IN CYPRUS. US SHOULD ALSO INDEPENDENTLY INFORM THE GREEK GOVERNMENT THAT WE ARE DEEPLY CONCERNED BY IRRESPONSIBLE ACTION OF THE NATIONAL

GUARD WHICH IS PURPORTEDLY UNDER COMMAND OF GREEK REGIME IN ATHENS. (C) WE SHOULD CONSULT WITH BRITISH IN LONDON REGARDING THEIR REACTION TO EVENTS IN CYPRUS, SINCE THEY ARE IN FIRST PLACE MOST VITALLY INVOLVED BECAUSE OF SBA'S ON ISLAND. (D) I ALSO BELIEVE IT WOULD BE WORTHWHILE FOR SACEUR TO INFORM MILITARY OF GREECE, AS WELL AS MILITARY REPRESENTATIVES OF TURKEY, WITH WHOM COMMAND IN CONTACT, THAT U.S. CONSIDERS IT OF GREATEST IMPORTANCE THAT THE GREEK MILITARY REFRAIN FROM INTERVENING IN EVENTS IN CYPRUS IN ANY WAY WHICH WOULD INDICATE EXTENSION OF GREEK SOVEREIGNTY TO CYPRUS. SACEUR SHOULD EMPHASIZE TO BOTH THAT ALL SHARE RESPONSIBILITY FOR MAINTAINING INTACT SOUTHERN FLANK OF NATO AND THAT ANY ACTION WHICH THREATENS IT WOULD BE VIEWED IN MOST SERIOUS FASHION BY ALL NATO ALLIES. (E) NATO SYG LUNS SHOULD ALSO BE ASKED TO INTERVENE IMMEDIATELY WITH BOTH GREECE AND TURKEY, BUT PARTICULARLY WITH GREEK GOVERNMENT, EXPRESSING HIS CONCERN NOT ONLY REGARDING INTEGRITY OF NATO'S SOUTHERN FLANK BUT ALSO SERIOUS EFFECT OF VIOLENT ACTION INSTIGATED BY AN AUTHORITARIAN GOVERNMENT ON NATO UNITY IN BROADER TERMS.

10. WHATEVER OUR COURSE OF ACTION WE ARE IN NEW SITUATION. OUR OVERRIDING INTEREST IS PEACE BETWEEN GREECE AND TURKEY AND A LONG-TERM VIABLE SETTLEMENT IN CYPRUS.

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WE SHOULD ALSO MAKE CLEAR TO GREEK PEOPLE THAT U.S. DEPLORES ASSOCIATION OF GOG REGIME WITH RESORT TO VIOLENCE IN CYPRUS AND THAT THIS IRRESPONSIBLE GREEK ACTION ONCE AGAIN UNDERLINES THE IMPORTANCE TO NATO, TO GREEK PEOPLE AND TO OUR BILATERAL RELATIONS OF THE EARLIEST RESTORATION OF SOVEREIGNTY TO GREEK PEOPLE.

11. FURTHER COMMENT TO FOLLOW.

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